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A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability
and Successor Corporations
The law of products liability has been with us in one form or another
since the middle of the 19th century.' Its scope has been continually expand-
ing ever since. Barriers to recovery such as negligence, warranty, and con-
tractual privity have been weakened and removed.2 Potential plaintiffs now
include users, purchasers, and even bystanders.3 Defendants include all
members of the manufacturing and marketing chain-retail and wholesale
sellers, processors, and marketers. One defendant traditionally absent from
this list has been the successor corporation.' Until recently the liability of a
corporate transferee for damages or injuries caused by products manufactured
by its predecessor had been limited, with few exceptions, to obligations ex-
pressly assumed at the time of the transfer.6
Lately, however, the legal rights and responsibilities of successors have
been subject to increasing scrutiny. Economic conditions in the last decade,
marked by upward-spiraling wages, prices, and interest rates, have resulted in
a pronounced increase in corporate acquisitions and mergers. Consequently,
persons injured by defective products often discover that the original manu-
facturer is no longer in existence, and the propriety and desirability of an
action against the successor has acquired a previously unattained signif-
icance. How the issue is finally resolved concerns everyone: the injured
party, the successor corporation, and the public at large, which must ultimate-
ly bear the cost of defective product injuries through higher prices or, should
the burden fall upon publicly financed compensation programs, through high-
er taxes.
The purpose of this Comment is not to suggest that all successor corpora-
tions should be held liable for dangerously defective products manufactured
by their predecessors. It is, rather, to define circumstances in which it is both
equitable and socially desirable to do so. In most cases the relevant inquiry
will be the extent to which the successor's business is a substantial continua-
tion of the business of the transferor, in terms of product line, management, or
product name. 8 This Comment advocates that a successor corporation should
1. R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 9 (1980). Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W.
109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842), is commonly cited as the first products liability case.
2. See generally MACHINERY AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INSTITUTE COUNCIL FOR TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCEMENT. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND RELIABILITY 13-21 (1967).
3. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 662-63 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Id. at 663-65.
5. For purposes of this Comment, the term 'successor corporation" will be used in a general sense to
refer to any corporation that has combined with another corporation or corporations through merger, consolida-
tion, stock purchase, asset purchase, or otherwise.
6. See generally Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two
Opposing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142 (1980).
7. Lipton & Steinberger, Introduction, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 375 (1978).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 99-124.
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be presumed liable for defective products manufactured by an acquired entity
unless the successor can show that it has in no way benefitted from the
activities of the predecessor as a continuation of its business. This method of
analysis will stabilize the law of successor corporation strict products liability
and will protect persons injured by dangerously defective products unless it is
clearly inequitable to do so. 9
Parts one and two below examine the strict products liability and cor-
porate law positions in some detail. 0 A marked and perhaps irreconcilable
conflict between the policies of the respective rules will be readily apparent.
Part three analyzes this policy conflict and examines how the courts have
dealt with it in corporate acquisitions. " Part four explains how this conflict of
interests can be resolved through a presumption of successor liability and the
possible rebuttal of this presumption. ' 2 Finally, part five examines the conse-
quences of adopting this new approach. 13
I. THE STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY
The purpose of the rule of strict tort liability 14 "is to insure that the costs
of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves." '5 Strict liability arises regardless of the
culpability of the party charged, even if all possible care was exercised in the
construction and sale of the product. 
6
The cause of action was created primarily to cope with the increasingly
complex nature of manufactured products.
In today's world it is often only the manufacturer who can fairly be said to know
and to understand when an article is suitably designed and safely made for its
intended purpose. Once floated on the market, many articles in a very real practi-
9. Id.
10. See infra notes 14-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra text and notes 47-98.
12. See infra text and notes 99-124.
13. See infra text and notes 125-42.
14. The general rule of strict liability is contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to
his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63,377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,701 (1963).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Limited defenses are available to manufacturers
in products liability suits. The two defenses most frequently asserted are misuse and unavoidable unsafeness of
the product. See id. comments h and k.
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cal sense defy detection of defect, except possibly in the hands of an expert after
laborious and perhaps even destructive disassembly. 1
7
Strict liability therefore places the burden of producing a safe product on the
manufacturer, which alone has the opportunity and business incentive to turn
out safe products and to correct defects.
Strict liability attaches to any manufacturer or any seller of a product, on
a retail or wholesale level, including the maker of a component part of the
final product.' 8 Plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries caused by defective
products under a strict products liability theory must establish (1) that the
injury was caused by the allegedly defective product, (2) that the product was
in fact defective and thus unreasonably unsafe, and (3) that the product was
defective when it left the hands of the particular defendant. 9
The policy behind placing responsibility for product safety on the man-
ufacturer is one of risk-spreading and fairness. Public interest in human life
and safety demands broad protection against the sale of defective products.
Manufacturers solicit the use of their products by representing, expressly or
implicitly, that they are safe and suitable for use. Therefore, strict liability
theory places responsibility for losses caused by dangerously defective pro-
ducts on the party that has created the risk and that has subsequently profited
by introducing the defective product into the stream of commerce.20 Judge
Traynor, in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,2' captured the compelling
nature of the strict liability action from a social perspective:
Even if there is no negligence ... public policy demands that responsibility be
fixed whenever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health in-
herent in defective products .... Those who suffer injury from defective products
are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time
or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a need-
less one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discour-
age the marketing of products having defects that are a menace to the public....
However intermittently such injuries may occur and however haphazardly they
may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant risk and a general one.
Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the man-
ufacturer is best situated to afford such protection.
2
This tort policy, however, runs counter to the policy behind corporate law,
which until recently has governed the strict products liability of successor
corporations.23
17. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973).
18. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 663-64 (4th ed. 1971).
19. Id. at 671-72.
20. Fegan
, 
Successor Corporations and Strict Liability, in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doc-
trines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 143 (1980).
21. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
22. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
23. See injra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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II. CORPORATE LAW
Corporate ownership of an enterprise may, in general, be transferred in
three ways: (1) by statutory merger or consolidation, (2) through a sale of all
of the stock of the transferor corporation to the transferee corporation, or (3)
by a sale of assets by the transferor corporation to the transferee corpora-
tion, a situation fraught with the most complex successor assumption of
strict liability issues.
In a statutory merger or consolidation 25 the surviving or consolidated
corporation takes over the assets of the constituent corporation or corpora-
tions, assumes any liabilities, and issues common shares or pays other appro-
priate consideration in exchange for the shares of the corporation to be con-
solidated or absorbed. 26 In other words, the acquired entity becomes an in-
separable part of the acquiring corporation. This type of combination is strict-
ly governed by state statute and is usually effected by filing with the Secretary
of State an agreement approved by both sets of shareholders. 27 Because con-
solidated or absorbed entities completely lose their corporate identities,
28
most statutes impose the liabilities (including strict products liability) of the
merged or consolidated corporation on the transferee. 29 Therefore, statutory
consolidations and mergers present little problem for the strict liability plain-
tiff-recovery from the successor is expressly permitted by law. A variation
on the statutory merger theme is the so-called de facto merger. ° This equit-
able doctrine favors substance over form and invokes statutory merger re-
quirements when the combination is judicially deemed to have the same prac-
tical effect.3
The second method of transferring corporate property is a sale of cor-
porate securities by the shareholders of the transferor to those of the transfer-
ee corporation. The result of this type of transfer can be distinguished from a
merger or consolidation by the continued existence of the acquired entity
after the transaction has been completed. In a sale of securities, the law does
24. Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on
Another Citadel, 10 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 584, 585 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Etension of Products Liability].
25. In a merger two or more constituent corporations combine into a single entity. The "surviving corpora-
tion" continues to exist. In a consolidation two or more constituent corporations combine to form a new
consolidated corporation. All the constituent corporations cease to exist. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS
713 (1970).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. §§ 103, 251 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.41 (Page 1978).
28. See supra note 25.
29. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1107 (West 1977) (corporations formed by merger or consolidation are
answerable for all the acquired or constituent corporation's liabilities whether or not the liabilities are
specifically assumed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259(a) (1975) ("all rights of creditors and all liens upon any
property of any of said constituent corporations shall be preserved unimpaired, and all debts, liabilities, and
duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said surviving or resulting corpora-
tion .... "); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.44(D) (Page 1978) ("all obligations, of or belonging to or due to
each of the constituent corporations, shall thereafter be ... vested in the surviving or new corporation without
further act or deed .... ").
30. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
31. See infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of the de facto merger
doctrine and its requirements.
[Vol. 43:441
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
not require that the transferee automatically assume the transferor's liabil-
ities.32 Since the acquired corporation continues to exist, it remains liable for
strict liability judgments based on its products.3 From an economic point of
view, however, indirect transferee liability results because the acquiring cor-
poration is a shareholder of the transferor. 4 If the resources of the acquired
entity are depleted as a result of products liability suits, the market value of
the corporation, and subsequently of its stock, will be reduced. The net result
is that the liability of the transferee is limited by the amount and value of stock
it owns in the transferor.
The strict products liability of the successor corporation in these two
methods of acquisition is largely settled. The liability is assumed by law in a
statutory merger 35 and occurs indirectly through the value of the transferor;s
stock in a sale of securities.36 Uncertainty arises in successor strict products
liability, however, in a sale of assets by the transferor corporation to the
acquiring entity. The consideration for the transaction will usually be straight
cash but could involve a combination of cash and securities, debentures, or
other secured debt.37 Traditionally, only the agreement struck by the parties
(as evidenced by the contract of sale) has governed assumption of possible
transferor strict products liability by the transferee in a sale of assets.38
A sale of assets presents problems in strict liability cases because there is
often no clearly evident successor: only a portion of the transferor's assets
may have been sold, and the seller may cease to exist after the sale. Further-
more, even if all the transferor's assets were sold to the transferee, the
transferee may have refused, either expressly or implicitly, to assume the
transferor's liability for improperly designed or manufactured products. In
this situation, as opposed to a statutory merger or purchase of stock, it is far
from clear which entity should be held responsible for strict liability judg-
ments against the transferor.
It is important to note at this juncture that corporations seeking to ac-
quire assets do not always have the luxury of choosing between all three of
the possible methods of acquisition outlined above. Particular facts and cir-
cumstances may exclude one or more of the options. For example, the acquir-
ing entity may not be able to secure the necessary shareholder votes for a
statutory merger or to raise the necessary capital for a cash purchase. It is
equally important to realize that possible liability for defective products man-
ufactured by the transferor corporation is only one of many factors in struc-
32. Ertension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 588.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra text accompanying notes 25-31.
36. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
37. See generally R. SHORT, BUSINESS MERGERS. HOW AND WHENTO TRANSACT THEM 15-32 (1967).
A prime factor in determining the type or types of consideration to be offered is the possibility vel non of the
transaction's being deemed a de facto merger by the courts. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
38. Ertension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 590-91.
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turing an acquisition. Tax consequences, the extent of statutory formality
required, and the desired corporate structure after the combination are all
considerations of equal or greater importance.39
The assumption of strict products liability by an acquiring corporation in
a sale of assets has traditionally been approached as a matter of corporate
law. 40 The general corporate rule is that the mere sale of corporate property
by one company to another does not subject the purchaser to liabilities that
have not been expressly assumed.4' As interpreted by courts in almost all
jurisdictions, this rule has served to protect buyers of corporate assets from
liability not expressly assumed, provided the transaction was made at arm's
length and for adequate consideration. 42 There are several exceptions to the
general corporate rule. Liability for obligations of the transferor will be im-
posed when (1) the purchaser expressly or implicitly agrees to assume the
obligations, (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the
two corporations (including a de facto merger), (3) the purchasing corporation
is deemed merely a continuation of the selling corporation, or (4) the transac-
tion is a fraudulent one, its real purpose being to escape liability for unas-
sumed obligations.43
The corporate law rule evolved primarily to satisfy known creditors of
the transferor at the time of merger or sale. 44 Usually, this kind of liability is
easily handled by the parties. Either the seller retains the commitments after
the sale takes place, or the buyer assumes them, probably cutting his price to
compensate for the additional future expense. In this manner the rule pro-
motes the free exchange of corporate assets by enabling the parties to strike
their own bargain on assumption of liability. 45 The corporate rule ignores,
however, the contingent claims of strict products liability plaintiffs.
46
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN TORT AND CORPORATE POLICY
On first impression the corporate law rule holding transferees liable only
for obligations they expressly assume is felt equally by tort victims and credi-
tors. Most claims of creditors, however, can be accurately ascertained at the
time of the acquisition; 47 the future claims of tort victims may not. In fact, the
39. See generally R. SHORT, BUSINESS MERGERS. HOW AND WHEN TO TRANSACT THEM 33-47 (1967).
40. Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Twvo Opposing Doc-
trines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 142 (1980).
41. Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
42. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 41, 45 (1975).
43. Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526, 527-28 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
44. Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 91 (1975).
45. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
47. Some contingent liabilities may in fact be uncertain at the time of the transfer but can nonetheless be
accurately estimated by the parties. One example is liability under express warranty, which can be easily
determined on the basis of the manufacturer's past experience. Warranties also, by their terms, have limited
lives. This factor adds an additional element of certainty to the estimation. In most states statutes of limitation
do not begin to run on products liability actions until the cause of action has accrued. I PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) 9 3420 (1981).
[Vol. 43:441
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
cause of action may not arise until years later, long after the corporation that
manufactured the defective product has dissolved, liquidated, or become in-
solvent. In this situation the corporate rule may "seriously prejudice a pro-
ducts liability claimant in his search for a viable defendant." 48
Ever since Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 49 in which the
California Supreme Court abolished the requirement in strict liability actions
of a warranty running from manufacturers to users of their products, courts
have been confronted by conflicting policy considerations regarding the strict
products liability of successor corporations in asset sales. While the corporate
rule promotes commerce and certainty, the tort rule dictates the opposite
result by compensating innocent victims who are unexpectedly injured by
dangerously defective products. At first courts almost exclusively favored the
application of corporate law over the law of tort. Plaintiffs stood little chance
of collecting strict liability judgments from manufacturers that had liquidated
their assets unless the transferee specifically assumed liability. While the
judicial response to a strict products liability claim against an acquired corpo-
ration would almost certainly have been "no" at the time of Greenman,
courts have begun to acknowledge the legitimacy of such a claim in recent
years. The reply has now changed to "perhaps.
' 51
This shift in judicial attitude has manifested itself in two ways. Some
courts have begun to construe more liberally the exceptions to the traditional
corporate rule, especially in the context of the de facto merger.5 2 Others have
abandoned the corporate rule completely and have treated the strict products
liability of successor corporations exclusively as a tort problem.53
A. Expanding the Exceptions
1. The De Facto Merger Theory
If a court considers a sale of corporate assets to be so similar to a merger
that it warrants subjection to the same procedural requirements and legal
48. Extension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 592-93. See, e.g., Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645
F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1981) (suit involving a rubber calendar machine that malfunctioned 58 years after it was
manufactured).
49. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). In Greenman the court held that the plaintiff was
not required to establish an express warranty with the manufacturer to recover on a strict products liability theory.
Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700 (1963).
50. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Schwartz v. McGraw Edison
Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rtpr. 776 (Ct. App. 1971); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555,
264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1972).
51. Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doc-
trines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 142 (1980).
52. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.,
506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Mich. 1974).
53. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). The fraud exception will not be discussed in detail below
because of its accepted common-law nature and the lack of any significant expansion of the exception by the
courts. The express or implied assumption of liability by a successor will not be analyzed in detail for similar
reasons.
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consequences as a statutory merger, the court will recognize a de facto mer-
ger.54 In effect, the acquiring corporation is held liable for the torts of the
transferor through state merger law.55 The court in Shannon v. Samuel
Langston Co. 56 summarized the characteristics that distinguish a de facto
merger from an ordinary purchase and sale of assets:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation, so that there
is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general
business operations.
(2) There is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing cor-
poration paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock
ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that
they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation.
(3) The seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and
dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible.
(4) The purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations of the
seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business
operations of the seller corporation. 
57
In Knapp v. North American Rockvell Corp.5 ' Knapp, an employee of
Mrs. Smith's Pie Company, was injured when his hand was caught in a ma-
chine known as a "packomatic," designed and manufactured by Textile
Machine Works Inc. (TMW). TMW, about one year prior to the accident, had
traded substantially all its assets for North American Rockwell securities.
Although certain liabilities were assumed by Rockwell, the decision was
based on the premise that the plaintiffs claim had not been assumed. 59 The
injury to Knapp occurred after the closing date of the purchase transaction,
but four and one-half months prior to the dissolution of TMW, which took
place 18 months after the closing date. 60 Although these circumstances tech-
nically precluded application of the de facto merger doctrine because the
transferor existed at the time of the injury,6' the court was willing to stretch
the doctrine and allowed the plaintiff to recover. "Denying Knapp the right to
sue Rockwell because of the barren continuation of TMW after the exchange
with Rockwell would allow a formality to defeat Knapp's recovery." 62
The Knapp court struggled to distinguish the case at bar from cases with
54. Ertension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 598.
55. Id. at 586.
56. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
57. Id. at 801.
58. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
59. Id. at 362-63.
60. Id. at 363.
61. According to the court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., this is the third characteristic that
distinguishes a de facto merger from an ordinary purchase and sale of assets. See supra text accompanying note
57.
62. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 368-69 (3d Cir. 1974). The decision has
provoked at least one state legislature to take steps to limit the de facto merger to successor tort liability. Texas
has enacted legislation stating specifically that a disposition of all or substantially all the property and assets
of a corporation requiring consent of its shareholders will not be considered a statutory merger or consolidation
and will not make the acquiring corporation liable for obligations it did not expressly assume. TEX. BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. art. 5.10B (Vernon 1980).
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similar fact patterns that had been decided against products liability plain-
tiffs. 63 It stressed the "insubstantiality of the continued existence of TMW,"
including the brevity of its postmerger life; contractual requirements that
TMW be dissolved as soon as possible, which prohibited TMW from engaging
in normal business transactions; and the character of the assets TMW control-
led after the sale. The court conceded that each of these factors was present in
the cases it was seeking to distinguish, but declared Knapp "unique in com-
bining all of these elements."' While the decision was clearly based on
corporate law, the policy behind the result, as described by Judge Adams, had
a distinctly tort law flavor: "[N]either Knapp nor Rockwell was ever in a
position to prevent the occurrence of the injury ... as neither manufactured
the defective device. As between the two parties, however, Rockwell is better
able to spread the burden of the loss." 61
Knapp, then, is an illustration of how a court can circumvent the general
corporate rule of nonliability and invoke tort policy by slightly bending the
requirements for finding a de facto merger, thus subjecting the successor
corporation to liability for the improperly manufactured products of its pre-
decessor through state statutory merger law. In Knapp the requirement that
TMW liquidate as soon as possible after the sale did not prevent a finding of
de facto merger, and the plaintiff was allowed to recover for an injury caused
by the transferor's product.
2. The Continuation Theory
Another generally recognized exception to the corporate rule holds trans-
ferees responsible for the liabilities of transferors when the acquiring corpora-
tion is merely a continuation of the entity acquired. 66 This exception is em-
ployed by courts less frequently than the de facto merger exception, possibly
because there is no judicial agreement on what circumstances require an ap-
plication of the continuation doctrine. 67 Courts have found a continuation
after considering a number of elements, both separately and in combination.
These include whether the manufacturing operations remained unchanged
after the transfer, whether there was a continuation of product line, product
name, personnel, or general business operations, and whether the successor
has officers and directors in common with its predecessor.
68
63. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Wis. 1973); McKee v. Harris-Seybold
Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288
A.2d 585 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1972). See also infra notes 68-70.
64. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 369-70.
66. See, e.g., Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
67. Comment, Successor Liability in Corporate Acquisition-An Eramination ofAttempts to Limit the Use
of the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 483,497 (1981). The continuity exception, however, is
more popular with the courts than the fraud or assumption of liability exceptions. Id.
68. See generally Lopata v. Bemis Co., 406 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Comstock v. Great Lakes
Distrib. Co., 209 Kan. 306, 496 P.2d 1308 (1972); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d
98 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), affdpercuriam, 118 N.J. Super. 480,288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
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The beginnings of the continuation exception reveal a rather strict read-
ing of "continuation." For liability to attach to a transferee, the new corpora-
tion needed to be no less than a "new coat" for its predecessor. 69 Conse-
quently, most or all the elements mentioned above had to be present before a
court would find a continuation. A number of modem courts have continued
to construe the exception in this manner, applying it only to simple changes in
the form of a business entity (as in the case of a recapitalization or a change in
corporate name or place of incorporation). 70 Because of the variety of circum-
stances to be considered in making a continuation determination, however, the
exception has also proved to be a convenient vehicle for courts bent on
imposing strict products liability on successor corporations without abandon-
ing the sanctuary of traditional corporate rules.
In Cyr v. B. Offen Co., 7' a 1974 case occasioned by a defective printing
press, the continuity exception was applied to a sale of assets by a sole
proprietor. Seventy percent of the acquiring corporation was owned by form-
er employees of the proprietor; the remaining shares were held by an "outside
financier." 72 The contract of sale provided that the buyer would assume
certain liabilities of the seller, but tort liability was specifically excluded.
73
The Cyr court held that at least two of four reasons cited by the plaintiff
for imposing strict liability applied to successors in ownership as well as
original manufacturers: first, the manufacturer [or the successor], compared
with the consumer, is better able to bear the cost of injuries caused by defec-
tive products; and second, the manufacturer [or the successor] is the party
best able to prevent such suits because it has control over product design and
quality. 74 More significantly, however, the court stressed that holding succes-
sor corporations liable for torts of acquired entities is a fair, reasonable, and
socially desirable policy:
The very existence of strict liability for manufacturers implies a basic judgment
that the hazards of predicting and insuring for risk from defective products are
better borne by the manufacturer than by the consumer. The manufacturer's suc-
cessor, carrying over the experience and expertise of the manufacturer, is likewise
in a better position than the consumer to gauge the risks and the cost of meeting
them. The successor knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects
69. Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash Cab Co., 110 111. App. 2d 415, 431, 249 N.E.2d 729, 737
(1969).
70. See Forest Laboratories v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971); Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F.
Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); McKee v. Harris-
Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), affd per curiam, 118 N.J. Super.
480, 288 A.2d 585 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
71. 501 F.2d 1145 (Ist Cir. 1974).
72. Id. at 1151.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1154. The two other reasons posed by the plaintifffor imposing strict liability, which the Cyr court
felt did not apply to successor corporations in a continuation or any other context, are as follows: First, it is the
manufacturer that has launched the product into the channels of trade; and second, it is the manufacturer that
has violated the representation of safety implicit in the product's presence in the stream of commerce. Id.
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as the predecessor, is in [a] position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale
negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the quality of the pro-
duct. 75
Cyr represents an expansion of the continuity exception because the
court, for the policy reasons above, tailored the elements considered to the
facts of the case in finding continuity. In the words of Judge Coffin, "[W]here
tort liability is concerned, we should look to factors relevant to the specific
claim and not be bound by factors that control where other debts and liabilities
are concerned." 76 Thus, Cyr was allowed to prevail even though successor B.
Offen & Company was characterized by an imperfect transfer of ownership
due to the outside financier's thirty percent interest and by a lack of continu-
ity of management. Under the usual strict reading of the continuity excep-
tion,77 these factors might have precluded recovery.
B. Breaking Awvay From Corporate Law-Ray v. Alad Corp. and Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co.
The vast majority of cases dealing with strict products liability claims
against successor corporations have applied the traditional corporate rule of
nonliability, finding in the plaintiffs favor only if one of the four exceptions to
this rule applied.78 Ray v. Alad Corp.79 was the first case to break clearly with
this precedent, completely discarding the corporate law and its exceptions in
favor of a tort-based analysis. 0 Plaintiff Ray was injured while using a defec-
tive ladder manufactured by Alad I, a family owned corporation with an
excellent reputation in the ladder industry. Less than one year before the
mishap, Alad I was acquired by defendant Alad II in an assets-for-stock
transaction. Alad II acquired Alad I's plant, inventory, trade name, and good
will and continued to manufacture the same line of ladders under the Alad
name. The successor used the same equipment, designs, and personnel as the
transferor and solicited Alad I's customers with the same sales repre-
sentatives, giving no outward sign that the corporation had changed owner-
ship.8'
The Supreme Court of California specifically rejected Ray's contentions
that the transaction constituted a de facto merger 82 and that Alad II was a
continuation of Alad 1.83 The two exceptions were construed rather strictly by
the court; it refused to expand them as was done in Knapp v. North American
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1153.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 66-70.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
79. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
80. See also Ramirez v. Amstead, 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979), and
Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 888, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Ct. App. 1979).
81. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 27-28, 560 P.2d 3, 5-6, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 577 (1977).
82. Id. at 28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
83. Id. at 29-30, 560 P.2d at 7-8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578-79.
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Rockwell Corp. 84 and Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. 85 because it thought that to do so
would set an unfavorable precedent for courts assessing liabilities to creditors
in general outside of a strict products liability context.!6 Strict liability, ac-
cording to the Ray court, is a unique problem of a successor corporation and
therefore deserves special consideration. 87
While the court did not furnish a clear holding, it extended this special
consideration either by (1) repudiating corporate law completely in successor
corporation strict liability cases, thus treating the problem strictly as a matter
of tort,88 or by (2) creating a new exception to the corporate rule: the "pro-
duct line" exception. 89 Regardless of how the holding is viewed, 90 the Ray
decision marked an unprecedented departure from usual corporate law con-
cepts and served notice to successor corporations that the trend favoring
strict liability for products manufactured by their predecessors was continu-
ing. The court's justification for the holding indicated that the tort policies of
fairness and risk spreading were of great importance, contrary to the cor-
porate law emphasis on certainty and express assumption of liability. The
three reasons given by Judge Wright for imposing liability on Alad II were:
(1) [The virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original man-
ufacturer caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the successor's
ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading rule, and (3) the fair-
ness of requiring the successor to assume responsibility for defective products that
was a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's good will being
enjoyed by the successor in the continued operation of the business. 9'
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. 9- most accurately reflects both the
willingness of courts to hold successor corporations liable for defectively
manufactured products produced by their predecessors and the judicial con-
fusion regarding which theory to use in doing so. Turner was injured on July
26, 1979, by a power press manufactured by T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company
(Old Sheridan). The machine was manufactured in 1903 and purchased sec-
ondhand by the Seaman Manufacturing Company, Turner's employer, in
1968. In 1964 Old Sheridan was purchased for cash by Harris Intertype Cor-
84. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974). See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
85. 501 F.2d 1145 (Ist Cir. 1974). See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
86. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30, 560 P.2d 3, 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977).
87. Id.
88. See Comment, Successor Liability in Corporate Acquisition-An Examination of Attempts to Limit the
Use of the De Facto Merger Doctrine, 46 J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 512-13 (1981); Comment, Extension of Strict
Tort Liability to Successor Corporations, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 595, 608-09 (1978); Extension of Products Liabil-
ity, supra note 24, at 510-11; 30 VAND. L. REV. 238, 252-53 (1977).
89. See Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing
Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 148-49 (1980). See also Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1931);
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d
253, 256, 395 N.E.2d 19, 22 (1979).
90. Justice Wright does nothing to resolve this conflict in the course of his opinion in Ray-he refers to the
decision as both a "special departure" from the corporate rule and a "special exception" to that rule. Ray v.
Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30, 560 P.2d 3, 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977).
91. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
92. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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poration through a newly formed subsidiary, New Sheridan. Old Sheridan
dissolved five days later. On July 24, 1968, New Sheridan formally merged
with Harris, becoming the Sheridan Division of Harris Intertype Corpora-
tion. 93 This convoluted set of facts caused the trial court to hold that Harris
and New Sheridan were "not responsible for a product to which they are
corporate strangers in the manufacture, sale and distribution thereof, and for
which they neither in fact nor law assumed legal liability." 94
The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, took a different view: "[T]his
is a products liability case first and foremost."gs It cited language in Ray
indicating that a break with corporate law is proper when the strict liability of
successor corporations is at issue 96 and apparently endorsed this interpreta-
tion. 97 Despite the strong language above indicating that tort law ought to
control, the court in Turner curiously elected to stay within the corporate law
framework when fashioning its holding. The result was a four-fold test that in
effect eliminated continuity of ownership as a requirement for satisfaction of
the continuation exception.98 Exactly why the court chose to feint in the
direction of a purely tort analysis, only to return to traditional corporate law,
is unclear. Perhaps it thought the decision would be better accepted by courts
of appeal and the public if it rested on a corporate foundation.
The state of the law regarding the application of strict products liability to
successor corporations, then, is complex. The policies behind the corporate
and tort rules are dissonant and perhaps irreconcilable: corporate law protects
purchasers of assets from unassumed liability, while tort law compensates
unsuspecting victims of dangerous defects that defy detection until after in-
jury has been sustained. The courts appear to be sympathetic to the strict
liability plaintiff yet reluctant to venture beyond the traditional corporate rule
and its exceptions.
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
Presently the victim of a dangerously defective product manufactured by
a corporation that has since transferred its assets to another entity has two
93. Id. at 411-13, 244 N.W.2d at 875-76.
94. Id. at 413, 244 N.W.2d at 876.
95. Id. at 416, 244 N.W.2d at 877.
96. Ray has been interpreted both as creating a break with corporate law and as merely adding a new
"product line" exception to the traditional corporate law rule. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
97. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 423-24, 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (1976).
98. Id. at 430, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. The Turner test, as applied by the court to the facts of the case, is as
follows:
(1) There was basic continuity of the enterprise of the seller corporation, including, apparently, a
retention of key personnel, assets, general business operations, and even the Sheridan name.
(2) The seller corporation ceased ordinary business operations, liquidated, and dissolved soon after
distribution of consideration received from the buying corporation.
(3) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and obligations of the seller ordinarily neces-
sary for the continuation of the normal business operations of the seller corporation.
(4) The purchasing corporation held itself out to the world as the effective continuation of the seller
corporation.
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possible sources from which to seek relief. First, suit can be brought against
the original manufacturer, provided the proceeds of the sale are still available
and sufficient to satisfy the claim. 99 This alternative is of little value if the
offending company has liquidated or dissolved before the cause of action is
manifest. 00 Liquidation and dissolution statutes require the satisfaction of
known liabilities before distribution of the proceeds among shareholders, but
do not address "contingent" products liability claims arising after the dissolu-
tion and distribution. '' Second, the victim can bring suit against the succes-
sor corporation, either alleging that one of the exceptions to the general
corporate rule of nonliability applies, or asking that his claim be considered
solely in tort, entirely apart from corporate law. The results to be expected
from this course of action are unpredictable, as indicated above.' 02
The strict liability plaintiff is hampered in both instances by the general
rule of nonliability imposed by corporate law-a rule not originally intended
to cover strict liability situations at all, but geared toward creditor protec-
tion.' 03 While the rule functions satisfactorily when the creditors are known at
the time of the transfer, it becomes strained when applied to "contingent"
tort liability and actually operates in reverse by denying claims against cor-
porations instead of protecting them. Thus, it appears Justice Wright was
correct when he concluded in Ray that some kind of special rule is necessary
to deal with strict liability suits against successor corporations.'04
A sensible solution to the problem would take into account both the
social and individual need for products liability plaintiffs to be compensated
and the business need to determine with reasonable certainty the liabilities
that will be assumed in a transfer of corporate assets. The fairest and most
99. Ertension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 593-94.
100. Id. The "trust fund doctrine," first advanced by Justice Story in Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435
(C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944), is a long-standing though unpredictable and cumbersome method of dealing
with this problem. According to Wood, the capital stock of a corporation is a pledge or trust fund for creditors.
After the corporation dissolves, the proceeds from the dissolution continue to be held in trust by the former
shareholders and may continue to be reached by creditors of the corporation if required by the principles of
equity. This liability is limited to the value of the stock held; no further personal liability is imputed. Id. at
436-37. For a discussion of the trust fund doctrine, see generally Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to
Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution: Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate
Assets, 30 BUS. LAW. 1061 (1975).
Another suggested remedy is to require escrow accounts or indemnity agreements to satisfy contingent
liabilities of liquidated corporations. See Barton, Business Combinations and the New General Corporation
Law, 9 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 738, 807 n.262 (1976). The problems with this approach, however, are many. Because
products liability judgments vary tremendously in amount, it is difficult to determine the total value of the assets
that should be placed in escrow for this purpose or the amount of liability insurance coverage that the successor
corporation should obtain. Further, it is difficult to estimate how long these arrangements should be continued
after the product is manufactured.
101. Ertension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 593-94. At least one state, California, has decreed
by statute that a dissolved corporation continues to exist for the purpose of defending lawsuits and discharging
obligations. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 2010 (West 1977). This statute has never been used successfully to
assert a strict products liability claim. E.&tension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 594. Even if such a
plaintiff were to prevail, however, it is by no means certain that the directors involved could satisfy ajudgment.
Id.
102. See generally supra text accompanying notes 47-98.
103. Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 91 (1975).
104. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 30, 560 P.2d 3, 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977).
[Vol. 43:441
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
predictable manner in which to accomplish these objectives is to presume the
successor corporation to be liable for defective products manufactured by its
predecessor. In other words, after the plaintiff has proved that the strict
liability claim is a valid one and that the defendant is in possession of the
assets that produced the defective product, a prima facie case of successor
liability is established and a presumption of successor liability raised. To
rebut this presumption, the successor will have to show that it is not benefit-
ting through the reputation or personnel of the transferor, or from the assets
acquired. The best indicator of this kind of benefit appears to be a broad
inquiry into whether the successor is a continuation of the corporation ac-
quired.
An examination of this proposition must start with the law of strict liabil-
ity and its application to an original manufacturer of defective products. The
law of tort is concerned, according to Prosser, "with the allocation of losses
arising out of human activities".' 05 The purpose of tort law is to allocate these
losses in a manner most advantageous to society as a whole and to compen-
sate one party for injury sustained as a result of the conduct of another.'06
According to the strict products liability theory, losses resulting from injuries
caused by defectively manufactured products are properly placed on the
manufacturer of the product.107
If the corporation that originally manufactured the defective product sells
its assets to another entity, however, present law completely eliminates the
strict liability cause of action with respect to the successor. 08 In fact, present
law presumes the successor not to be liable unless one of the four exceptions
to the general rule is satisfied.'09 To determine if this substantial shift of
presumed liability after a sale of assets is justified, 0 it is necessary to consid-
er what effect that shift has on the policy reasons behind imposing strict
liability on the original manufacturer.
The court in Cyr. v. B. Offen & Co.,"' when confronted with four rea-
sons provided by the plaintiff for imposing strict liability on an original man-
105. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (4th ed. 1971).
106. Id.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1%5).
108. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. The scope of the shift of presumed liability can be illustrated by a continuum showing different levels
of presumption or nonpresumption of strict products liability. The original manufacturer of a defective product
is absolutely liable if the product injures someone. If the same manufacturer sells his assets, the transferee,
under the general corporate law rule, is presumed not to be strictly liable for the same defective product. See
supra text accompanying notes 40-45.
ORIGINAL P SUCCESSOR
MANUFACTURER (SALES OF ASSETS) CORPORATION
ABSOLUTE PRESUMED PRESUMED ABSOLUTE
LIABILITY LIABILITY NONLIABILITY NONLIABILITY
I PRODUCTS LIABILITY
IIf. 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974).
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ufacturer, concluded that while two of these reasons did not apply to a cor-
porate successor, the other two clearly did. ' This analysis is symbolic of the
inquiry as a whole-there are many reasons for treating successor corpo-
rations differently from their predecessors about strict products liability, and
as many for treating them in a similar fashion. Regardless of which entity
owns the assets that were used to manufacture the defective product, there
remains an injured user who is unable to protect himself or herself from the
dangerous instrumentality. Compared with the user, the successor is still a
better vehicle for spreading the risk of that injury because of its financial
superiority. Further, if the successor continues to produce the same or a
similar product, or utilizes the same directors, management, or other per-
sonnel, it continues to benefit from past good will accumulated by the trans-
feror. On the other hand, the transferee was not responsible for placing the
defective product in commerce and did not profit from doing so, except per-
haps indirectly through the good will acquired from the transferor. "
3
Because a balancing of the equities results in a virtual stalemate, the shift
from the absolute liability of a manufacturer to a presumption of nonliability
based solely on a transfer of corporate assets is too great. A better rule would
be to adopt a middle course and shift from absolute transferee liability to
presumed absolute liability on the part of the transferee. The technical effect
of such a presumption of law would be that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary a judge or jury would be obligated to find for the plaintiff. "
To rebut the presumption of absolute liability, the successor corporation
would have to show the inequity of placing that responsibility upon it. The
presence or absence of a broadly construed continuation of the transferor is
the appropriate vehicle to accomplish this because it covers all the circum-
stances in which successors are asked to assume that liability under present
law, yet it extends the law far enough to provide certainty in what is now an
unpredictable situation-liability pursuant to a sale of assets. "5 The burden
should be one of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence; the mere
presentation of evidence will not be enough. 116 This will not be an easy burden
to carry, nor is it meant to be. It should be a rare case when the successor
acquires so little benefit from a purchase of assets that it does not merit being
held liable for defective products manufactured by the transferor.' '7
A broadly construed continuation analysis " 8 should include any factor in
112. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
113. For a more complete discussion of the policy considerations behind strict products liability see supra
notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
114. IX J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2490 (1981).
115. A broadly construed continuation rule would include both statutory and de facto merger situations.
Both types of combinations are viewed as exceptions to the general corporate rule of nonliability precisely
because the resultant continuity between the merging corporations is great. The other two exceptions, which
involve express or implied assumptions of liability and fraud, would be unchanged by a broad continuation
approach.
116. IX J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2498 (1981).
117. See infra text accompanying notes 141-42.
118. As opposed to a strict construction of continuation requiring that the successor be no more than a
'new coat" for the acquired entity. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
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the transfer that bears on the reasonableness of forcing a successor corpora-
tion to assume strict liability claims against its predecessor. A comprehensive
but not exhaustive list would include (1) liquidation or dissolution of the seller
corporation, (2) continuity of product line, (3) continuity of general business
operations, (4) continuity of management and personnel, (5) adequacy of
consideration, (6) existence of an express or implied agreement to assume
liability stemming from defective products or otherwise, and (7) sale of sub-
stantially all the transferor's assets, or of substantially all a certain
product line. The relative weight of each of these and other factors would
depend heavily on the facts of the particular case, but no single consideration
should control; one may be enough in some circumstances, three or four may
not suffice in others.
Note that this approach would not change the holdings of cases such as
Knapp v. North American Rocklvell Corp., "9 Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 120 Ray v.
Alad Corp., 12 or Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. '2, In all four of these
cases the presumption of successor liability would impose liability. However,
the new approach would achieve these results through a common method of
analysis; contortion of the general corporate rule and its exceptions would no
longer be necessary to impose liability on successor corporations. The meas-
ure of certainty provided by a common analysis will benefit both successor
corporations and users of products by allowing them to better predict future
liability and to plan accordingly.
The approach to successor strict products liability discussed above may
be summarized as follows: Plaintiff (P) is injured operating a machine pro-
duced by a corporation (C) that, before the injury to P occurred, sold its assets
to a successor corporation (S). P must first satisfy the basic requirements of a
strict products liability action by showing (1) that an injury was caused by the
allegedly defective product, (2) that the product was in fact defective and thus
unreasonably unsafe, and (3) that the product was defective when it left the
hands of the defendant. 123 P must also show that the assets of C have been
purchased by S. If P can establish all the above, S will be presumed to be
liable to P on a strict tort theory as the successor of C.
To rebut the presumption above and escape liability, S will have to show
that it is not a continuation of C and is not benefitting in any substantial
manner from the good will established by C while C was in business. S will
base its argument on the seven factors above and on any other considerations
it deems relevant. This will be a very heavy burden for S to bear, and the
result will probably favor P unless S is using the assets to produce a complete-
ly different kind of product and has clearly disassociated itself from C in
almost every other possible manner. 2a
119. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
120. 501 F.2d 1145 (lst Cir. 1974). See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
121. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 78-91.
122. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
123. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
124. S, at the time of the acquisition, may have structured the transaction so that C is actually bearing the
burden of P's injury. See infra text accompanying notes 126-39.
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V. THE CONSEQUENCES
An analysis that presumes successor corporations strictly liable for de-
fective products produced by predecessors in interest would be a significant
departure from traditional practice. Accompanying this departure is an un-
certainty about the consequences. The major fear is an economic one: if
purchasers of corporate assets are required to assume responsibility for strict
liability claims against products previously manufactured by the former own-
er of the assets, the purchaser is in effect being forced to pay consideration in
excess of fair market value. As a result, acquisitions will be discouraged.2'
Sellers of corporate assets may not be able to fird buyers and consequently
may be forced to dispose of the assets individually, sacrificing the good will
that would attach to their sale as a unit. Therefore, the argument goes, de-
stroying the corporate rule of successor nonliability would result in terminat-
ing the seller's business "in a manner that neither optimizes the use of re-
sources nor, because it appears unfair and unworkable to impose liability on a
buyer of individual assets, protects products liability claimants." 
2 6
There is little doubt that the analysis in part four above, which almost
certainly allows strict liability suits to be brought against corporate succes-
sors, will make negotiations between corporate buyers and sellers more com-
plex. One of the parties will have to bear the cost of possible products liability
suits based on goods manufactured by the seller before the sale. Once buyers
are aware that they face liability in this manner, however, they can fashion
ways to protect themselves against it that would in effect force the seller to
absorb the cost. This result is desirable both from a tort policy point of view,
because the actual manufacturer of the defective product pays for the harm
caused by the product, and from a corporate law perspective, because it
facilitates the free transfer of corporate assets. It is also intuitively fair to
place the loss, if possible, on the corporation that manufactured the product
causing the injury.
The most straightforward manner in which the transferee can shift the
cost of products liability judgments back to the transferor is simply to pay less
for the assets acquired. Elementary economics dictates that groups of assets
that may subject the purchaser to contingent claims against them do not have
the same value as assets acquired free of those claims. Exactly how much less
the assets are worth would be determined primarily by the type of goods the
assets were used to produce. An automobile assembly line, for example,
manufactures an extremely complex product that conceivably could lead to a
large number of very expensive strict products liability judgments. On the
other hand, the product of a bookbinding factory would expose the purchaser
to less products liability litigation, with a lower average award per suit. There
are a number of variations on this lower-price-for-assets theme. The trans-
125. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 55-56 (1975).
126. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 43:441
SUCCESSOR CORPORATIONS
feror can be required to establish an escrow account to service products
liability claims, 27 former shareholders of the transferor can be required to
execute a personal indemnity agreement, 28 or the selling corporation can be
required to obtain or continue products liability insurance.' 29
Each of these protective devices has its particular problems. An escrow
account is unwieldy because it is uncertain how long the fund should continue
to exist and how large it needs to be to satisfy the claims that may be
made against it. The kind of product the assets were used to manufacture and
the product's capacity to injure will provide some guidance in this regard, but
the accuracy of even the most educated guess would be inherently suspect. 3 0
Further, in situations in which the seller wants to liquidate and dissolve after
the transfer, there may be no funds to put in escrow after current liabilities to
creditors and shareholders have been satisfied. ''
Although it may be possible for the successor to contract with sharehold-
ers of the transferor to indemnify it for subsequent strict liability claims, this
would not be an easy concession to exact. Limited liability is one of the most
attractive features of the corporate form, and it is doubtful that many share-
holders would agree to personal liability for future judgments against a liq-
uidated corporation. Legislation requiring assumption of personal liability
could be proposed, but its passage might seriously impair the market value of
corporate securities. Consequently, a personal shareholder indemnity con-
tract would probably be feasible only if the seller is a close corporation with a
small number of willing shareholders.
32
Liability insurance generally is available to original manufacturers to
protect them from strict liability judgments against their products. ' Usually
a product-caused loss occurring outside of the policy period is covered by the
employer's products liability insurance if it was sold during the policy tenure.
However, this rule may be circumvented if the terms of the policy so state. 134
Given the growing tendency of courts to saddle successor corporations with
the tort liabilities of their predecessors, it would be sound policy for states to
require manufacturers to carry products liability insurance that will protect
127. Extension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 611 n. 149.
128. Id.
129. Id. This alternative was suggested by the court in Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797,
802 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
.130. This problem occurs in a different form when the successor pays a lower price for a group of assets in
anticipation of possible strict products liability judgments: the lower price may not be low enough to cover the
amount needed to satisfy these judgments. With an escrow account, however, a new problem arises: if the
assets placed in escrow are depleted, on whom does the risk of injury due to defective products fall? The answer
is beyond the scope of this Comment but deserves careful consideration by the parties to such agreements.
131. Extension of Products Liabilihy, supra note 24. at 611 n. 149.
132. The successor could always hope that the courts would apply the trust fund doctrine of Wood v.
Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,994), and reach the former shareholders of the transferor
without any kind of agreement. It is doubtful, however, that this step would be taken when a more viable
defendant exists-and in most cases, that defendant would be the successor itself. See also supra note 100 for a
more complete explanation of the trust fund doctrine.
133. II COUCH ON INSURANCE § 44:380 (2d ed. 1963).
134. Id. at § 44:385.
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users of their products for the life of the product. Otherwise, a transfer of
coverage can be arranged between buyer and seller. 
3 5
As a last resort, the buyer could procure liability insurance himself.
However, this task may not be as simple as it sounds: some kind of past
insurance dealings with the carrier are often required, and the desired cover-
age may be available at a reasonable cost only as part of a "package" deal. '36
Furthermore, unless the successor. can pass the price of the insurance back to
the original manufacturer by deducting it from the purchase price of the
assets, the transferee must bear the entire burden of obtaining the coverage.
Sound policy and considerations of fairness would place the cost of insurance
on the original manufacturer if possible. 
3 7
In most cases, then, it will be possible for the buyer to effectively place
the burden of possible strict liability claims on the seller of the assets, which is
exactly the result that tort policy would dictate. 38 This can be done either by
reducing the price paid for the assets, the most effective and least complicated
alternative, or by requiring the seller to take other action such as setting up an
escrow account or procuring or maintaining products liability insurance.
While it is possible that the extra expense or lower market value may cause
the seller to dispose of its assets individually, a company going out of business
will most likely still find it financially advantageous to sell its assets as a unit,
receiving at least a modicum of additional compensation for good will. 39
The method of dealing with strict products liability and successor corpo-
rations proposed in part four above 40 will still leave without remedy some
plaintiffs injured by dangerously defective products. The unlucky soul who
finds himself or herself injured by a product manufactured by a corporation
that has simply liquidated or dissolved, or by one that has sold its assets to a
buyer that is able to rebut the presumed strict liability assumed by the pur-
chase, will be left to his or her own devices. ' 4' Although this is not necessarily
a desirable state of affairs, the purpose of the analysis above is not to show that
the victim of a defective product should be compensated regardless of who
possesses the assets that manufactured the product. The intent is to make suc-
cessor corporations responsible in situations in which it is in the best interests
of both the victim and society as a whole. When the successor has not benefit-
ted in any discernible way as a continuation of the transferor, to impose strict
liability for products manufactured by the transferor is neither just nor socially
135. Extension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 611 n.149.
136i Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break from Tradition, 49 COLO. L. REV. 357,
378 (1978).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
139. Juenger & Schulman, Assets Sales and Products Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 39, 57 (1975).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 99-124.
141. These victims may be eligible for relief in the form of worker's compensation, social security, and
other similar benefits vesting as a result of injury or death.
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desirable. "At some point the interest favoring corporate acquisitions will
appear to outweigh those interests underlying the risk of loss theory in product-
liability cases." 142
V1. CONCLUSION
The history of strict liability is one of conflict between an emerging
doctrine and numerous previously inflexible rules that had to be pushed aside.
Before MacPherson v. Buick44 negligence in the manufacturing process had
to be shown before recovery for a defective product was possible.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors'44 and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.' 45 abolished the previously insurmountable obstacles of warranty and
contractual privity requirements. The battleground has now shifted from the
structure of the rule to its scope. In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.46 the First Circuit
became the first court to hold a cash purchaser of assets liable for injuries
caused by an unsafe design implemented by the previous owner of the as-
sets 47 and to signal an assault on yet another mainstay-the rule of corporate
successor nofiliability in the absence of an express assumption thereof.
Courts have gradually become sensitive to the plight of those who must
rely on increasingly complex products that they do not understand and from
which they cannot protect themselves. Strict products liability policy recog-
nizes, further, that this is not an individual problem but one of general social
concern-it affects all of us, whether or not we actually use these products
ourselves. The cost of industrial technology should therefore properly be
shared by society as a whole, if possible, or by the party best able to spread
the risk. The strict products liability doctrine purports to do exactly that.
The purpose of the strict liability doctrine, however, has never been to
expose manufacturers to liability for injuries with which they have no connec-
tion or obligation to rectify. The purpose of the doctrine is to remove un-
reasonable barriers to recovery. " In the words of one commentator, "Strict
liability has never meant liability without responsibility for the defect." 49
"Responsibility" for a defective product means having created the risk of
injury; it is rightly placed on the manufacturer of the product. 5 0 If the corpo-
ration that manufactured the defective product changes hands, it is fair, rea-
sonable, and good public policy to transfer the responsibility to the successor,
provided the successor is benefitting from the transfer as a continuation. Once
142. Extension of Products Liability, supra note 24, at 611.
143. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
144. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
145. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
146. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
147. 10 CUM. L. REV. 633, 638 (1979).
148. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641-58 (4th ed. 1971).
149. Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doc-
trines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142, 153 (1980).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
this principle is established, transactions can be structured so that financial
responsibility for defective products remains with the original manufacturer.
An alternative method of providing products liability protection to all
plaintiffs would be to enact a comprehensive legislative scheme having this
effect.' 5' Because of the fundamental policy clash between strict tort liability
and corporate law 52 and the resulting inconsistency of judicial interpreta-
tions, 53 this may be the most effective way to achieve certainty.'4 Although
an increasing number of states have some kind of products liability legislation
under consideration, 155 most of this legislation is aimed at slowing the growth
of products liability claims by placing date-of-sale limitations on claims or
ceilings on recoveries. 56 Of particular interest is the possibility of insurance
statutes requiring products liability coverage for the life of all products manu-
factured. 57 If the cost of that coverage were not prohibitive, this would ap-
pear to be the best overall solution to the problem of successor strict products
liability.
The law of strict products liability of successor corporations is in a state
of uncertainty. 58 Unless the parties effect a statutory merger or expressly
agree to delegate the liability among themselves, both the corporations and the
injured plaintiff must cast their lot to the courts, whose only tools are a
general rule meant to protect creditors and some inconsistently interpreted
exceptions. 59 A rule that presumes successor corporations to be liable for
defective products manufactured by their predecessors, yet allows the pre-
sumption to be negated by a showing of no benefits to the successor corpora-
tion as a continuation of the transferor, would establish a fair and consistent
framework for determining transferee liability. '60 The certainty provided by a
151. Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: A Break From Tradition, 49 COLO. L. REV.
357, 375-78 (1978). In fact, it has been argued that this is one major problem with Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d
22, 30, 560 P.2d 3, 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 579 (1977). Judicial protection for all plaintiffs in the narrow class of
those bringing suit against successor corporations on a continuation theory may reduce the impetus for compre-
hensive legislative reform of strict liability laws by diminishing the class benefitting from such reform. Note,
Products Liability and Successor Corporations: A Break From Tradition, 49 COLO. L. REV. 357, 375 (1978).
152. See generally supra notes 14-39 and accompanying text.
153. See generally supra notes 47-98 and accompanying text.
154. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 110 (1975);
Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A Break From Tradition, 49 COLO. L. REV. 357, 375
(1978). In Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (1977), the court refused to impose the Ray v. Alad Corp.
decision on Wisconsin courts because "such broad public policy issues are best handled by the legislature with
their comprehensive machinery for public input and debate." Id. at 441.
155. In 1975 there was not a single state statute directly addressing the problem of successor corporation
liability for products manufactured by a corporate predecessor. Two years later 39 states had some form of
successor corporation products liability statute under consideration. Note, Products Liability and Successor
Corporations: A Break Front Tradition, 49 COLO. L. REV. 357, 375 (1978).
156. Id. at 375-76. It has been argued that these types ofstatutes do not constitute procedural defenses, but
in fact abolish substantive rights. If this is the case, a "legitimate legislative purpose" must be established if
violations of federal due process and equal protection guarantees are to be avoided. Id. at 377 n. 117.
157. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 47-98.
159. Id.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 99-124.
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uniform approach would aid successor corporations in planning for potential
liabilities or losses. If this framework were established, corporations would at
last be able to structure transactions in ways that simultaneously reflect their
intentions and protect those injured by dangerously defective products.
Bennett A. Manning

